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STUDENT ESSAY

WHAT THE US ARMY SHOULD DO ABOUT
URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE

BY

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INFANTRY

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WHAT THE US ARMY SHOULD DO ABOUT

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE

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ABSTRACT

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This paper is addressed to the problem of what the US Army should do about urban guerrilla warfare. It concentrates on strategy and broad principles. It discusses some observations on and theories of guerrilla warfare, the urban environment, definition of and conditions for urban guerrilla warfare, strategic goals, operational objectives and military characteristics and typology of the urban guerrilla movement, phases of urban guerrilla war, converse strategic goals, operational objectives and policies of government engaged in stability operations. It suggests the possibility of strategic urban guerrilla warfare as a form of war. It discusses legal and doctrinal considerations for the US Army and the possible US Army roles in urban stability operations and strategic guerrilla warfare. It concludes: that the US Army should develop strategic and tactical doctrine for the conduct of urban stability operations; that the US Army Institute for Military Assistance be assigned the task of developing doctrine and training for urban guerrilla warfare; that a type US Army organization be developed for employment in urban stability operations; that said doctrine and training programs stress education and training in the behavioral sciences; that a US Army manual be published on urban guerrilla warfare; and that the role of the US Army in strategic urban guerrilla warfare be studied further.

What the US Army Should Do About Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is a game anyone can play. It is cheap and therefore many play it. It requires no masses of troops, armament, equipment, specialized units or complex organization. It is also played for a variety of reasons.

Guerrilla warfare has always occupied a central role in communist theory as a vehicle of revolution and communization of the world. The "balance of terror" which, for reasons both moral and practical, has and probably will prevent both US and USSR from using nuclear weapons or other force which might cause nuclear retaliation, has made guerrilla warfare even more probable as a weapon between the free and communist worlds.

As societies of the world progress toward urbanity,¹ modernity and interdependence, urban guerrilla warfare becomes more likely. We shall examine and analyze some aspects of the urban environment, urban guerrilla warfare, and indicate some strategies and objectives and suggest what should be the role of the US Army in urban guerrilla warfare. We shall confine ourselves to broad strategic principles and to considerations which should apply to all urban guerrilla situations and exclude consideration of tactics and techniques which will vary according to culture, geography, means available, and political, social and economic organization.

Observations on and Theories of Guerrilla Warfare

Thinking on guerrilla warfare has come to us as the theories of communist writers, as Marx,² Lenin³ and Mao,⁴ observations and theories cast in the discipline of sociology,⁵ and the pragmatic observations and directions of contemporary authors such as Moss,⁶ Thompson⁷ and Marighella.⁸ All of these writings consider guerrilla warfare as an instrument of revolution.

Communism has generated two rather opposite theories of guerrilla warfare

depending on differences in basic theories of revolution. Marx's view⁹ was that:

- 1) The bourgeoisie would destroy the remnants of monarchy and feudalism and would create its own state,
- 2) Revolution against the bourgeois state would be undertaken by the upper class (industrial workers) of the proletariat, which would eventually remake society into a classless organism and the state would eventually wither away, its function of oppressing the working classes no longer being operative.

Marx emphasized the need for violence and armed struggle by the masses of the industrial proletariat, which, to the exclusion of other classes, would bear the burden of making the revolution and remaking society. Marx recognized that this struggle took place in the urban setting.

Lenin adapted Marx's ideas to the Russia of 1917. Then Russia was a pre-bourgeois state, having disposed of its monarchy but not having substituted therefor a truly well developed bourgeois state. Following Marx's theory it could be said that since the bourgeois state had not developed capitalism and therefore enlarged and developed the industrial proletariat, it would follow that the industrial proletariat was not yet prepared to take over the state and therefore no further revolution would or could be had at that time. This was indeed the position of the mensheviks. Lenin's prophet-like opportunism caused him to lead the bolsheviks to ally with the peasants and secure the support of the lumpen-proletariat, all of whom wanted any revolution rather than no revolution. In order to govern the resulting state, Lenin and his heir Stalin, to make up for the weakness of the proletariat, worked in the name of the proletariat through a new elite of theorists, bandits and psychopaths which was later to develop into a new bureaucratic class. Under Lenin the struggle was planned to and did take place in the city but the intelligent moving and directing force of the revolution was a much smaller group than under Marx's theory, while under Lenin the armed struggle also spread to the

countryside.

The opposite theory of guerrilla warfare has been promulgated by Mao Tse Tung of the Chinese Communist Party and his followers.¹¹ The Maoist theory is that the revolution begins in the countryside and the peasantry is the main moving force. Armed struggle is begun by small guerrilla bands who are given supplies and refuge by the local population. There are remote safe areas where guerrillas can train and rest. The guerrillas by their military activities gradually erode the strength of the government forces and the government forces gradually withdraw from the countryside to the larger villages and their cities, at each step being harassed by the guerrillas. The villages are used to surround the city and immobilize the government. This is, of course, a picture of South Viet Nam or Cambodia. The final step is to attack the city, its supply from the countryside interdicted, and it falls easily. The presence of government tactical air power and an airlift (as Pnom Penh recently) makes execution of the final step difficult for the guerrilla movement.

Oppenheimer¹² analyzes urban revolution in sociological terms covering much of the ground of Marx, Lenin and Mao, and points out some difficulties in urban guerrilla war. One difficulty is ideological. Theorists are often unable to adapt to conditions in the field, thus their theories, while effective as guides to initiating guerrilla warfare, at the same time they are followed are preventive of achieving the final object, that of winning the war. An example is the recent experience in Cambodia. The rural based communists surrounded Pnom Penh, containing more than half of the population. It appears that there was not much if any guerrilla activity within the city itself. The support of Pnom Penh with tactical air power and supplies from outside for as long as it lasted produced a stalemate.

A second difficulty is that the kinds of personalities who are well suited to beginning an urban guerrilla war on a small group or elite basis are unable

to attract or adjust to the structure of mass support necessary to win the final battle and the war. The people who begin guerrilla war are likely to be criminals and radicals who are basically combat-oriented and anti-structural and cannot later step back into a structured environment when they have dedicated themselves to destroying structure. Their combative orientation also gives difficulty in later readapting to peaceful society.

A third difficulty cited by Oppenheimer relates to organizational problems. Pressure on the revolutionary organization results in difficulties of the members in trusting and relating to one another and such an organization is always vulnerable to penetration by police informers.

Current writings on urban guerrilla warfare by such as Moss,¹³ Reilly¹⁴ and Will¹⁵ are rich in description of guerrilla warfare situations and tactics and technique and their thinking and some current US Army doctrine on rural guerrilla warfare and other sources referred to have all been helpful in constructing the following analysis.

The Urban Environment

In about 30 years city dwellers in the world will for the first time outnumber villagers.¹⁶ In the past, cities were established and grew for basically economic reasons.¹⁷ In the city, where people are in close propinquity, they are able to effect a specialization of tasks, occupations and economic organizations so that a given effort produces more goods in return. Increased return has produced surplus goods to invest as capital, further increasing the return from labor. Over many years the typical city and its countryside developed an exchange of the manufactured products of the city for the agricultural and extractive products of the countryside. In this exchange relationship the city and the countryside were each essential partners, depending on the other for part of their needs. The city, however, had less ability to do without the exchange relationship than did the countryside. As a result a

popular method of warfare starting in the middle ages has been the siege of the city. The scenario being that the siege broke the links of the city with the countryside on which the city depended for sustenance and the city fell.

Another reason for the growth of cities in the 19th and 20th centuries has been the great advance in medical care, causing the survival of many who would otherwise have perished of disease. These survivors have swelled the size of the city by being born in the city and also by being driven from the countryside to the city by a shortage of agricultural employment. These seem to be important factors in the present growth of cities of South America.

A further aspect of the historical development of the city has been the intellectual, social and political ferment, caused by the mutual propinquity of the population and the availability of discretionary time released to individuals because of the productivity of their labor.

While economic and population growth have been occurring for many centuries, there has been a rather steady increase in the rate of growth in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. This increase in the rate of growth has assumed geometric proportions in the last 30 years and has produced some new and enhanced some old features of the urban environment which may have important effects on military strategy.¹⁸

Increased growth has made city workers more productive, has therefore increased the amount of discretionary time available to city residents and as a further result has increased the intellectual, social and political ferment of the city. Combined with the increase in communication and transportation this has caused a great increase in the penetration by the city into the countryside with societal change. Once the life style of the city had not much effect on the rural population, but now the life style of the city is the mode in the countryside of almost any developed nation.

The cities of the world have also developed a great network of complex

and interrelating economic and social linkages. What happens in London affects New York, which effects Chicago, which in turn effects Cleveland, Louisville and so on. This applies even between cities of the free and communist parts of the world, right through political boundaries and even iron curtain barriers and seems to be a process which is increasing at an accelerating rate. The exchange of goods, services and ideas between cities has come to be more important than the exchange of goods, services and ideas of any particular city with its hinterland. A companion effect to this interdependence of cities has become the increasing economic independence of any particular city from its countryside, even in terms of supply of staples. This is due to the fact that any particular city can be sustained through exchange of goods and services with other cities rather than with its own countryside.

This economic and social interdependence of cities and economic and social independence of a city from its countryside has in the past been illustrated by the city colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore, which have been supported by sea lines of communication. More recently the emergence of air power as a tactical and logistical instrument has permitted the survival of both West Berlin and Pnom Penh. The Berlin airlift caused a stalemate in the USSR effort to capture Berlin by the classic method of laying siege to the city, breaking its links with the outside world. The siege was ended by the political decision of the USSR after the stalemate had been established for some time. Most recently, US tactical air and airlift support created a stalemate in which the Khmer Republic held the city of Pnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge held nearly all of the countryside of Cambodia. This stalemate was broken by the US decision to terminate both tactical air and airlift support.

The city, however, has vulnerabilities which are not present in the countryside. The same effort applied to the interdiction of the functions of the city will yield a greater return than if it is applied to the interdiction

of the functions of the countryside. City structure depends on specialization of its inhabitants and on their use of capital, which is also specialized. The destruction or impairment of specialized economic organs of the city will cause a greater disruption to the city than the similar in scale destruction of a portion of the economic organization of the countryside. Thus, destruction of the pumping station for the water supply of a city could be accomplished by explosives carried by one man, while the same explosives employed in the countryside under the most optimal conditions would inflict far less damage.

The preceding features of the city lead to certain additional conclusions. One is that if the economic and social links between a city in a highly developed nation and its countryside are broken, the specialized cash crop and agriculture and extractive industries will be unable to subsist without supplies from the city, markets in the city and communication and transportation provided by the city. The deleterious effect of loss of its links with the city on the countryside of an underdeveloped nation in which agriculture is organized into small family subsistence operations is much less pronounced.

It is also clear that the modern city, if its economic linkages with its countryside are broken, or its economic organs are impaired, has a better ability to survive than does the countryside. This is because the modern city has economic linkages with other cities on which it can depend, together with modern communication and transport. This survival, however, is at the price of lowering the contribution of the particular city to the economic system of the network of cities of which the city is a part.

Finally, the population of the city is generally more dependent on the functioning of the city as an entity and therefore is more dependent on the government of the city than is the population of the countryside. This is because of the dependence of members of the city population on the system of specialization of labor tasks and functions in the city.

Based on the above discussion it may therefore be concluded that the urban environment may become an arena for guerrilla warfare for any of the following reasons. First, the vulnerability of the city as described, invites exploitation. Second, in a highly developed society such as the US, Britain, West Germany or France, the dependence of the countryside on the city as the focus of economic and social activity makes it extremely unlikely that a Mao Tse Tung style rural guerrilla movement could prevail over the cities in a war of guerrilla attrition. Therefore, if there were to be a revolution in a well developed society, it would have to take place, at least in part, in cities. Third, in an underdeveloped state in which a guerrilla movement has started in rural areas it may be impossible to bring the revolution to a satisfactory conclusion without guerrilla warfare in the urban environment. Thus, it was necessary to conduct guerrilla warfare in Algiers even after guerrilla warfare had been initiated in the Algerian hinterland. Algiers, a seaport, was divorced from many of its links with its hinterland and yet did not fall to the guerrilla movement, partly because of support by sea from France. Fourth, it appears to be Marxist-Leninist doctrine, never abrogated, that revolution must be carried on in the city. Fifth, the particular participants, in special cases, may not be acquainted with possibilities for guerrilla warfare other than in the urban environment.

Definition of Urban Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is defined as "military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces."¹⁹ Subversion is defined as "Action designed to undermine: 1. the military, economic, psychological, morale or political strength of a nation, 2. the loyalty of its subjects."²⁰ In this paper it is considered that guerrilla warfare includes subversion in its definition, since subversion

takes place as part of the first, or organizational stage of guerrilla warfare. Urban guerrilla warfare is guerrilla warfare conducted in an urban environment. There are three important aspects to the definition of urban guerrilla warfare. First, it is defined by the activity involved, that is military operations, which imply the use of force or contemplation of the eventual use of force. Second, it is defined by the character of the actors involved, the weaker side in terms of conventional military strength. Third, it is defined by the place where it occurs, the urban environment, as discussed above.

All in this paper is intended to be applicable to urban guerrilla warfare. Some of it may also apply to rural guerrilla warfare. The many obvious differences between urban and rural operational environments cause differences in degree and quality between urban and rural guerrilla warfare. For example, cellular organization of urban guerrilla forces (discussed below), while necessary in the urban setting is not necessarily present in the rural guerrilla warfare setting.

The Urban Population and Conditions for Urban Guerrilla Warfare

In the usual situation a government has the active loyalty and support of only a small proportion of its population.²¹ This can typically be anywhere from 10 to 30 per cent. The guerrilla movement starts out with a much smaller proportion of the population giving it active loyalty and support, possibly less than one person in a thousand. Between the government with its control apparatus and its supporters and their opponents in the guerrilla movement are located the majority of the population whose lives are oriented toward points of reference outside the government -- guerrilla conflict, such as family, friends, work. This majority of the population is mostly mildly loyal to the government or at least content to live within the system sponsored by the government, even though some members of this majority may be somewhat disaf-

fectured with the government. We shall call this majority the uncommitted group.

An essential prerequisite condition for the conduct of guerrilla warfare which is especially applicable in urban guerrilla warfare is that there must be a significant potential for the disaffection, even alienation of large parts of the uncommitted group and the government supporting group of the population from the government.²² This potential disaffection can be political, social or economic in origin. It can exist because of a feeling that the government is not legitimate because it is a dictatorship or because it is corrupt or ineffective. It can exist because there is a feeling of deprivation compared to other individuals or groups, or because of a need for self expression which is prevented by perceived governmental repression. This potential for disaffection, when it is developed into actual disaffection, is important to the guerrillas for two reasons. First, it produces aid for the guerrillas which they need to exist and to operate. Just as Mao's fishes in the sea the urban guerrillas need connections with the population to gain intelligence, promote their own security and gain logistical support. Second, the disaffection is nourished and enlarged by the guerrilla movement in its attack on the government, and indeed is the basic building block in guerrilla strategy.

The Urban Guerrilla Movement: Strategic Goals

The strategic goals of the urban guerrilla movement are fourfold. The first goal is to detach the uncommitted group from the government by actions which realize the potential for disaffection and alienation. This may take place by the disaffection of the entire population on the basis of one great issue, such as police repression, or may be the result of a process in which smaller ethnic, economic or other social groups are detached one at a time. Accomplishment of this goal gives the guerrilla movement increased freedom of action and mobility which enhances their ability to proceed to the second goal.

The second goal is to secure to the guerrilla movement the active loyalty

of some and the assent or passive acquiescence of the rest of the uncommitted group. Accomplishment of this goal increases the power base of the guerrilla movement and prepares for implementation of the third goal. The third goal is to erode the strength of the government's apparatus of control (the army, the police, etc.) by detaching loyalties of its members, by inflicting casualties on its members, by reducing the logistical, intelligence and security base of the apparatus and finally by getting the apparatus to overextend itself. Accomplishment of this goal changes the relative power of the guerrilla movement vis-a-vis the government so that the guerrilla movement becomes more powerful than the government. The final goal is to destroy the government as an entity and replace it with the guerrilla movement.

The goals of the urban guerrilla movement differ from the goals of the conventional military force. The conventional force historically has had goals such as destruction of the enemy military force or the taking of territory; these are similar to the third goal of the guerrilla movement. The conventional force has historically not often had the goal of destruction of the enemy government such as was the goal in World War II, while every authentic revolutionary guerrilla movement must have this goal. The first two guerrilla goals, of detaching the population and securing cooperation of a portion of the population have much less significance in conventional warfare. This illustrates the primacy of political, economic and social strategy in urban guerrilla warfare. Conventional warfare is fought on the terrain of the earth's topography while urban guerrilla warfare is fought on the terrain of the human mind and the social organism.

The Urban Guerrilla Movement: Overt Operational Objectives

Overt urban guerrilla warfare operations may be endlessly described and classified according to types of violence employed (as kidnappings, assassi-

nations, bank robberies), but in a search for strategic principles it seems better to classify overt guerrilla operations according to tactical or operational objectives. These tactical or operational objectives are means or milestones on the way to accomplishment of strategic objectives, just as tactical objectives contribute to the accomplishment of strategic objectives of conventional forces. Here we classify overt operational objectives by the effects sought and find them to be of six types:²³ 1) propaganda, 2) civil disturbance, 3) logistic, 4) sabotage, 5) repressive terror and 6) structural terror.

Propaganda is any information, ideas, doctrine or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behavior of the target population of the urban guerrilla.²⁴ It may be direct or indirect and can consist of lies or rumors but always tries to persuade. Examples of propaganda are the proclamations and communiques of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland or the taking over of a crowded theatre in Montevideo by Tupamaro guerrillas so that they may harangue the audience.

Civil disturbance is defined as group acts of violence or disorder prejudicial to public law.²⁵ We extend this definition for the purpose of analysis to include public demonstrations, assemblies and strikes when conducted for guerrilla purposes. A civil disturbance is planned and organized by the guerrilla movement and has as its purpose the production of turmoil, heightened emotion in the populace and the generation of confidence in the participants in their assuming of attitudes which favor the guerrilla movement. The purpose of a civil disturbance is always to directly influence masses of the population. Examples are the numerous strikes, demonstrations and rallies promoted by the bolsheviks in Moscow and St. Petersburg in 1917 and the demonstrations and riots at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Illinois, 1968.

Logistic operational objectives are designed to support the guerrilla

movement and do not include the covert support provided by elements of the population. These are directed toward securing critical high value items such as money and arms. Examples of operations with logistic objectives are bank robberies in pre-revolution Russia by Josef Stalin or the pilfering of a police box in Japan by Mun Se-Kwang to get the .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver he later used in the attempted assassination of the President of Korea in August, 1974.²⁶

Sabotage is an act with intent to damage, interfere with or obstruct by wilfully damaging or destroying materiel, premises or utilities.²⁷ The purpose of sabotage operations can be to directly reduce the effectiveness of the government, to reduce its logistical base, or to reduce the ability of the city to perform certain functions in support of other outside forces. Examples of sabotage are the blowing up of urban electric power transmission facilities or the destruction of a hijacked airliner by the Black September movement.

Repressive terror is directed by the guerrilla movement against members of the population for the purpose of enforcing guerrilla directives. It is designed to force the population to support the guerrilla movement. Examples are: Viet Cong killing of a villager who gives information to the government or the enforcement of a "tax collection" by the Irish Republican Army in Ulster.

Structural terror is the terror employed against the government, police, army and civilian structure which supports the government. It is designed to systematically terrorize members of the establishment in order to paralyze its operations. Structural terror also has the long run effect of unleashing repressed resentments, making it easier for hitherto uncommitted persons to carry out violence against the government and its control apparatus. Examples of structural terror are the assassination and kidnaping of political figures, hijacking of airliners, assassination of policemen and sniping at army personnel.

Some comments should be made regarding urban guerrilla overt operations.

It is seldom that an operation has only one objective. Most guerrilla operations have several operational objectives. A strike might have civil disturbance, sabotage and propaganda objectives. A raid on a police station in which police are killed, the police radio is destroyed and weapons taken may have structural terror, sabotage, logistic and propaganda objectives. Another important feature of most of the six categories of guerrilla operational objectives is that they can be designed to provoke repressive measures by the government. The idea is to get the government to overreact, and in so doing punish the uncommitted population, which then tends to detach itself from the government. Another effect of overreaction by the government is to cause it to dissipate or overextend its forces by increasing the proportion of troops on t, or by stationing more troops in smaller units at more locations.

The Urban Guerrilla Movement: Military Characteristics

The urban guerrilla movement displays certain military characteristics in its organization and operations which enhance its ability to survive and accomplish its goals in the face of what at the beginning is the stronger government force. These military characteristics are:²⁸

Motivation is very high, usually because of belief in a revolutionary cause, but it could be the result of the presence of anti-structure personality types or a high degree of professionalism.

Discipline is very rigid, to make up for difficulty in coordination and security.

Covert organization and activities are the rule except when necessary to use force or for another planned purpose. Exposure creates risk.

Cellular structure is the key to organization, pyramiding from bottom to top. Each individual knows only his team members; each leader knows only the next higher leader, so exposure of a few will not destroy the entire movement.

Intelligence is emphasized far beyond its scope in conventional warfare. Without extremely detailed and complete intelligence no operational plan is considered an appropriate risk. Intelligence is actively gathered by all members.

Security permeates every aspect of recruiting, organizing, planning, supplying, communicating and in conduct of operations, in order to prevent observation or discovery of the guerrilla organization or its penetration by government forces, compensating in part for the inability of the guerrillas to defend territory.

Attack, including raids and ambushes is the only form of overt tactical operation used, and is ordinarily of extremely short duration in execution, to minimize effects of government reaction.

Surprise is planned as an essential prerequisite to every tactical operation, compensating for numerical and firepower inferiority of the guerrillas.

Defense is never undertaken as a tactical operation, because it implies retention of terrain, which urban guerrillas cannot do.

Elitist character of urban guerrillas emanates from other characteristics above, such as motivation, discipline, covert, and cellular organization and security. These characteristics make entrance into guerrilla ranks difficult and time consuming, with various tests applied to the entrant as he progresses to becoming a full fledged member of the guerrilla organization.

Phases of Urban Guerrilla Warfare

A phase is a distinct period of an operation, at the conclusion of which the nature and characteristics of the action change,²⁹ or a step in the development of the urban guerrilla war. The urban guerrillas, operating with their military characteristics, pursue their strategic goals by accomplishing operational objectives and the whole is integrated into phases in order to produce a rational development of the urban guerrilla war. We identify three phases

of urban guerrilla warfare: subversion, insurgency and insurrection.³⁰

Subversion Phase: In which the guerrilla movement organizes itself and develops its basic structure. In this phase the military characteristics of the urban guerrilla movement appear, and the first two strategic goals of detaching the uncommitted group from the government and of securing to the urban guerrilla movement the loyalty of some and the passive acquiescence of the rest of the uncommitted group are pursued. Operations are typically undertaken with propaganda, civil disturbance and perhaps logistical objectives. This phase may prevail over a long period of time and is characterized by a rather low level of violence. In this phase the government may have a difficult time identifying the urban guerrilla activities as subversion phase warfare and may misidentify these activities as simply unorganized political unrest or a rise in the crime rate.

Insurgency Phase: In which the urban guerrilla movement conducts systematic, low intensity violent aggression against the government, short of civil war.³¹ Here the third strategic goal of eroding the government's control apparatus is sought. Military characteristics are reinforced, as adherence to them enhances survival of the guerrilla movement. Typically operations have objectives of sabotage, repressive terror and structural terror, with other operational objectives also pursued to a lesser degree. The level of violence is controlled by the urban guerrilla movement, and has escalated from the low level of the subversion phase. The insurgency phase, being controlled by the guerrilla movement, lasts as long as necessary to prepare for successful execution of the insurrection phase, and thus may prevail for more than a few years in time.

Insurrection Phase: In which the fourth and final goal of destruction of the government and its replacement by the guerrilla movement is sought. This is a difficult, dangerous, unstable phase of a very short time duration in

which the guerrilla movement accomplishes a transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare. The operational objectives of guerrilla warfare are still sought, but added to these are the conventional objectives concerning seizure of terrain and destruction of enemy troops by the use of overt, massed fire power. Violence escalates to the spasm level if necessary to obtain a decision for either the government or the guerrilla forces. In this phase the key terrain such as waterworks, telephone centrals, radio stations, police stations, army barracks are seized and held. Block by block control over the city is asserted by the guerrilla movement. The nature of the organization of the city is such that without the presence of outside conventional force, substantially the entire city will be captured by the guerrilla movement within a few days or weeks, or the guerrilla movement will be defeated. This phase is comparable to the war of movement phase of rural guerrilla warfare.³² But while the urban insurrection phase is short in time, the rural war of movement phase may be experienced over an extended period of time, perhaps months or years.

While phases are described in rather distinct terms, their description is not meant to preclude the pursuit of any particular strategic goal or operational objective in any particular phase. The description of a phase is meant to give a general guide to the kinds of activity typically found in that phase.

It is not necessary for the urban guerrilla movement to go through all phases in order to come to power. An example of development through all phases is the 1917 bolshevik revolution. The 1957-59 Cuban revolution underwent subversion and insurgency and the government fell without the need of insurrection. The French revolution of 1789 seems to have developed directly from subversion to insurrection. Failure in the insurrection phase may condemn the guerrilla movement to regress to the next preceding phase of insurgency, as with Tet, 1968, to beginning of a conventional civil war, as in Spain in 1936,

or simply to extinguishment, as in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1944.

The Urban Guerrilla Movement: Typology

Not all urban guerrilla movements which meet the definitional standards of employment of force by a conventionally weaker group in an urban setting have the same basic purposes, nor do they represent the same societal forces. Urban guerrilla groups can be classified as to type by their basic purposes and the forces they represent and they can then be described in terms of their strategic goals, operational objectives and military characteristics, as set forth in the preceding urban guerrilla movement model.

Criminal Guerrilla Movements: Here the basic purpose is to secure an economic monopoly of criminal activity, such as gambling, narcotics or prostitution, and in later stages of development to enter legitimate business. The strategic goals of the criminal movement never include the destruction of the government. The criminal movement may have as a goal the erosion of just enough of the strength of the government to allow it a free hand in its activities. The criminal guerrilla movement is parasitic to the government. Operational objectives emphasizing repressive terror are important. The criminal movement displays the guerrilla military characteristics. An example of the criminal guerrilla movement is the crime syndicate run by Al Capone in Chicago in the 1920's.

Grievance Guerrilla Movements: The basic purpose of a grievance group is to achieve status to negotiate, then get concessions from the government. The strategic goals of detachment from the government and attachment to the guerrilla group are present, while operational objectives of propaganda and civil disturbance predominate. Military characteristics set forth above are present. Grievance guerrilla movements seem likely not to survive in time, for either the group is not well organized enough to survive, or their grievances are redressed and the group dissolves, or the group becomes revolutionary or becomes

a political, economic or social movement by renouncing violence and engaging in political, economic or social activity. It may be that the Black Panthers started as a grievance group and have now changed to a political movement. An example of grievance guerrillas would seem to be early labor union strikes to achieve bargaining status.

Anarchist Guerrilla Movements: The basic purpose of anarchism is the destruction of the state, so all strategic goals are sought, all operational objectives are pursued and the military characteristics are present. Anarchists historically have been and are likely to continue to be very small groups except in Spain of the 1930's, and the elitist military characteristic is emphasized.

Indigenous Revolutionary Guerrilla Movements: The basic purposes of these movements may be anti-colonial (nation building), or simply to replace the existing government, or to secede a portion of territory from the existing country and government. This type of movement most closely fits the urban guerrilla movement model described above, and all strategic goals, operational objectives and military characteristics are present. A good example of an indigenous revolutionary guerrilla movement is the Algerian revolutionary movement of the 1950's.

International Guerrilla Movements: These guerrilla movements represent forces outside the country in which they operate. Operational objectives and military characteristics of the model are present. However, the principal differences between international guerrilla movements and indigenous guerrilla movements lie in the strategic goals which are sought. It may be to the interest of the outside force, which can be either a major power or an international movement such as communism of the 1920's, to not pursue the final strategic goal of destroying the government. The interest of the outside force is paramount and the guerrilla war will be conducted in accordance with that interest.

An example of an urban guerrilla movement run by an outside force is the bolshevik communist party in Germany in the 1920's.

In considering the above types of urban guerrilla movements it must be noted that this type classification is an aid in analysis of any particular movement. The types are not mutually exclusive, in fact any particular guerrilla movement may partake of several different types and it also may change in time from one type to another. As an example it may be true to say that the Viet Minh began in the 1940's as an indigenous revolutionary group but in addition became an international guerrilla movement sponsored by both USSR and PRC communist governments.

The Government: Strategic Goals

The government has strategic goals and operational objectives converse to those of the urban guerrilla movement.

The government strategic goals are also fourfold. The first goal is to prevent detachment of the uncommitted group from the government, by allaying the fears of the populace, by reforms and other actions. The second goal is to secure the cooperation of the uncommitted group. The third goal is to identify and isolate the guerrilla movement, while the fourth is to destroy the guerrilla movement. The government in its operations may at any particular time be striving in different parts of the population to accomplish different strategic goals. Thus, it may accomplish each successive strategic goal in one ethnic group while it has not yet accomplished the first strategic goal in another ethnic group.

The Government: Overt Operational Objectives

Civic program is defined as political, social and economic measures employed by the government to reduce alienation and disaffection in the population. This is the most important operational objective of the government. Without an effective civic program the government--guerrilla conflict is a sterile contest

of violence and psywar in which no equilibrium can be maintained by the government without constantly applied overwhelming force.

Propaganda is a government operational objective. With propaganda the government must portray the guerrilla movement as violators of local morality, and it must give a favorable portrayal to government efforts to help the population.

Population and resource control is defined as actions undertaken by a government to control the populace and its materiel resources or to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against that government.³³ Operations which deny access to arms fall in this category, as would issuance of ration cards or work permits.

Intelligence is defined as the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of areas of operations which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.³⁴ Government intelligence must be comprehensive, even exhaustive and must cover every aspect of the entire area of operations. This is so because, in trying to identify and isolate the guerrilla movement, the government is looking for the proverbial needle in haystack. Intelligence must enable the government to determine 1) the existence of an urban guerrilla movement, 2) the phase in which the urban guerrilla war is being conducted, 3) the type and goals of the guerrilla movement and 4) all other conventional information. This is a large order. Intelligence of the sort needed is not generated overnight but may take many years to develop properly.

Force directed against the guerrilla movement is the final operational objective of the government.

Just as with the overt operational objectives of the urban guerrilla movement, the government, in its operations may incorporate several operational

objectives in one operation. Incorporated, as appropriate, within the government operational objectives are defenses to the overt operational objectives of the guerrilla movement. For example, government force directed against the guerrilla movement may be in defense to structural terror by the guerrilla movement.

The Government: Policies

From the foregoing discussion of the features of the urban environment, the strategic goals, operational objectives and military characteristics of the urban guerrilla movement, and the converse strategic goals and operational objectives of the government, one can state four policies which if followed by the government armed forces will enable the containment and defeat of the urban guerrilla forces with the most economical use of forces. These policies, as with all abstract ideas, require extensive knowledge and judgment to weigh and apply and in many ways interrelate. They are:

Civic Program Dominance³⁵ The civic program is the key to retention of the uncommitted and all military activities must support and complement it. The armed forces must not pursue programs which would either degrade the effect of the civic program or unleash forces counterproductive to the civic program. A basic problem of the French in Algeria was that they pursued both civic and military programs which ended up denying any favorable effect for the civic program.

Discrimination: Employment of force must be restricted to urban guerrilla targets. If the peripheries of force affect the uncommitted they will be detached from the government and may become supporters of the guerrilla movement.

Restraint: Only such force as is necessary to accomplish the object must be used. This is a rule of law for American police operations. If unnecessary force is used, uncommitted observers may become detached and politicized, producing countereffect. Of critical importance is the promulgation of rules of engagement for troops. Application of this principle restrains the level of violence but does not necessarily imply that the presence of the armed forces in

terms of numbers of troops need be reduced.

Attrition: The government must combat the guerrilla movement by a policy of attrition. If the three preceding policies are followed, attrition is a necessary result. It takes more time to exercise discrimination and restraint and to let the civic programs develop their effects. It also takes time to produce intelligence which is adequate to be used to selectively eliminate the guerrilla movement. Time in terms of years must be made available by the government. There are no quick fixes. If grand battles are fought, one side or the other is the beneficiary of an error of judgment of the other side. The haste of General Massu and his highly efficient paratroopers completely removed the guerrillas from Algiers, but with such methods that the native population was completely alienated and the French lost the war in Algeria.³⁶

Strategic Urban Guerrilla Warfare

From the foregoing discussion of the urban environment and the model of the urban guerrilla movement, it becomes clear that there are possibilities of attacking an enemy power not only by the obvious nuclear and conventional means and by sponsoring guerrilla warfare within its cities, but by sponsoring guerrilla warfare in cities which interconnect with cities of the enemy power. The object is to interrupt the delicate, intricate and complex linkages to the cities of the enemy power so that the cumulative drain on the strength of the enemy power becomes significant.³⁷ This appears to be a strategy contemplated by the USSR in preparation for war against US.³⁸ This strategy requires thorough preparation extending over a period of years prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

Policies which should be followed by the attacker in strategic urban guerrilla operations are: first, indigenous forces must be used to the extent possible. These indigenous forces will probably need the motivation of a cause which has revolutionary implications. Second, concentration of urban guerrilla

forces must not be greater than the maximum which can be supported by the sympathetic population. Third, development of the urban guerrilla war will be maintained at the subversion or insurgency levels so as to maintain the maximum steady drain on the enemy. If the insurrection phase is entered, it is likely that government forces will react so as to destroy the urban guerrilla movement. Fourth, a strategy of attrition is to be followed, so as to achieve the greatest long run effect.

US Army Role: Legal and Doctrinal Considerations

The laws of the United States provide that US Army forces can be employed to control domestic violence and assist in disaster operations only under the prior direction of civil authority. It is contemplated that such assistance is rendered on a temporary basis.³⁹

US Army doctrine contemplates that guerrillas will operate in mountains, forests, jungles, swamps and may operate in rural communities.⁴⁰ It is further contemplated that strategic guerrilla operations are conducted independently against target complexes deep in enemy territory.⁴¹ Stability operations doctrine contemplates rural operations but does not mention the urban environment.⁴²

The only observed reference in doctrinal publications to urban guerrilla warfare is among missions assigned to Special Forces units, wherein it is stated that they will have the mission of assisting local government in neutralizing the insurgent political leadership and infrastructure. It is specified that good intelligence is needed, but does not specify who is to produce this intelligence.⁴³

It is clear that if the US Army is to have any mission in urban guerrilla warfare there must be made available a doctrine for operational guidance and for training of its units. Some thoughts on what role the US Army might play are as follows:

US Army Role: Urban Stability Operations

The government, in combatting the urban guerrilla movement, has the task of identifying that there is a guerrilla movement, its type, what phase of guerrilla warfare is being experienced, and other more conventional intelligence relating to strength, identification and location of guerrilla units and their plans. The government will operate offensively against the guerrilla movement by pursuing the strategic goals and operational objectives and following policies set forth in preceding sections. It will also operate defensively by preventing the accomplishment of the operational objectives of the urban guerrilla movement. These defensive operations are essentially reactive and may consist of guarding vital installations to prevent sabotage and logistic objectives from being accomplished by the guerrilla movement, or patrolling areas to prevent public gatherings which might ripen into planned civil disturbances. Military participation in the government's operations may be analyzed as follows:

Government Effort Directed and Executed by Civilian Political Authority:

The overall social and political nature of urban guerrilla warfare together with the nature of the strategic goals, operational objectives and policies of the government is such that the government effort is ideally carried out by the civil authorities. The civil authorities have a greater inherent ability to communicate with the population, greater flexibility and greater probability of being able to assemble the intelligence required over the long period required for its gathering.

In contrast, the typical conventional US Army combat organization has as its primary mission the closing with enemy military formations and destroying them by fire and maneuver. All training and selection of personnel and weapons and unit organization is oriented toward this primary mission. This orientation does not square with the necessities of urban guerrilla warfare.

Government strategic goals of preventing the detachment of the uncommitted

group, and of securing cooperation of the uncommitted group are best pursued by political authority through operations with civic program, propaganda, population resource and control objectives. The third strategic goal, of identifying and isolating the urban guerrilla movement, is best pursued by civilian police, through population and resource control, intelligence and force directed against the guerrilla movement operational objectives. The government police force has greater inherent capability than an army unit in penetrating the guerrilla organization through the screen of its military characteristics and undertaking very small scale tactical operations directing force against the guerrilla movement. The government civilian team also has an inherent advantage over the military unit in being better able to limit its operations by following the policies of discrimination, restraint and attrition.

Government Effort under US Army Direction: This condition is intended to display the most intense level of Army involvement at the other end of the spectrum from complete civilian control and operation of the government effort. While it is undesirable that the US Army take over the entire government effort against the urban guerrilla movement, and it is also unlikely that it would be necessary to do so, it is helpful from an analytical point of view to describe how the US Army might operate at this end of the spectrum, if it were ever required to do so.

The condition which must exist before the Army assumes complete direction of the government effort against the guerrilla movement is that there is substantially a complete breakdown or nonexistence of the civilian government agencies. This does not mean that the civilian government is operating unsatisfactorily, but that it really is not functioning in any appreciable degree. This role of the US Army would be a last resort and could only be justified by extreme circumstances.

The condition might occur which would justify use of the US Army in such

an all inclusive role where the army is operating in support of a government of a nation which is underdeveloped, which has recently been occupied territory and is liberated by US Army forces, or where the US Army is occupying territory of an enemy nation. This condition is not considered a practical possibility in the US because of our well developed democratic institutions.

If the US Army is to operate in such a milieu, pursue the strategic goals and operational objectives of the government and follow the policies of the government, it must have an organization which gives it all of the capabilities of the civilian agencies of government. In fact, it must be a highly disciplined governmental body. This organization cannot stress capabilities of controlling its mission-situations with firepower, but must stress capabilities of controlling its mission-situations with socially and politically oriented communication with the population. The organization deployed for any particular situation must be tailored not only to its mission and general tasks but to the particular urban environment.

Overall direction and control of the US Army effort should be given to units and commanders particularly trained for this mission and with a mature understanding of the strategic goals, operational objectives and policies to be followed by the government in combatting the urban guerrilla movement. The possibility of placing this function under the Civil Affairs branch and making the Civil Affairs branch an active duty branch should be carefully considered. If this is done, it follows that the US Army organizations planned for this function would be Civil Affairs units.

Other branches and units which should be represented in the Civil Affairs organization which might be organized to control the government anti-guerrilla movement effort are: Military Police, Military Intelligence, Psyops units, Special Forces (in a direct action small unit tactical role), Engineer, Medical, Signal and Transportation. Coordination of doctrinal development and training

among all these branches and units can be undertaken by the US Army Institute for Military Assistance.

Government Effort under Civilian Control, but with US Army Assistance:

If the US Army is involved in combatting an urban guerrilla movement, its most likely role will be to assist civilian authority, whether domestic or foreign. Here the number of variations in US Army programs and functions is great. The amount or degree of assistance required also has many variable solutions. If the US Army develops doctrine and organization for combatting the urban guerrilla movement which can be used in the extreme situations where the army takes over the government effort, then the army will certainly have the capability to give advice and assistance to the civilian governmental agencies where they are expected to control the anti-guerrilla effort. This advice and assistance can, toward the more intense end of the spectrum, consist of using the Civil Affairs units and their elements from other branches as a structure parallel to and backing up the civilian governmental agencies. At the other, less intense end of the spectrum it may consist of providing only training teams for certain specialized functions, such as intelligence, direct action small unit tactical missions, propaganda or civic programs.

Conventional combat forces can be used to assist civilian government authority in guerrilla warfare situations, but they must be used with recognition of their severely limited capabilities for these missions. As to their use in particular phases of guerrilla warfare, they are most useful in the insurrection phase. In this phase the guerrilla war undergoes a transition from guerrilla to conventional war, in which firepower, the seizing and holding of terrain is stressed. This is the basic purpose of conventional combat forces.

During subversion and insurgency phases of urban guerrilla warfare, conventional combat units may be tasked with the guarding of vital installations which are essential to the life of the city and its humans, such as water works,

electrical power lines or telephone exchanges. They may also be used to patrol disturbed areas. These are basically defensive or reactive measures, and should be undertaken for the shortest periods of time, in order to avoid any counter-productive effect in the population.

It is likely that conventional combat units have no substantial capability in conducting offensive operations against the urban guerrilla movement. This is because they are firepower oriented, as set forth above, because they do not have the intelligence capability especially for an extended period of preparation required to combat urban guerrillas, they do not have and are not trained in the development of communication links with the population through which the population can be controlled. It is also wasteful to deploy a very high cost large conventional unit in an urban guerrilla warfare situation, for its expensive equipment and many specialized combat, combat support and combat service support units are not well utilized.

Perhaps the most important reason that conventional combat forces should not be employed in urban guerrilla warfare is that their presence in the civilian population is a highly disciplined inward looking element which when attacked by guerrilla propaganda becomes perceived by the population as foreign and repressive. Conventional units are also targets for structural terror operations which are intended to and may provoke reprisals, thus operating to alienate the population from the government.

US Army Role: Strategic Guerrilla Warfare

Urban guerrilla warfare is primarily political and social warfare and a guerrilla movement is incomplete without a political and social rationale which it projects to motivate its members and secure the sympathies of the uncommitted group. It follows that US conduct of strategic urban guerrilla warfare, if undertaken, must have this political and social content. If it does not, it has very small chance of success in accomplishing its goals.

The US Army is traditionally oriented toward accepting civilian political and social direction and not toward formulating its own political and social doctrine for such a thing as strategic urban guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, a civilian intelligence organization such as the Central Intelligence Agency might be better suited, because of its greater flexibility in operating in the political and social milieu, to assume overall direction and control of strategic urban guerrilla warfare.

The role of the US Army is then to train indigenous personnel in the arts of urban guerrilla warfare, and possibly to commit guerrilla warfare teams to the operational area. It appears that the Special Forces branch is best suited for assuming the US Army missions and functions in this area.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The US Army does not now have available a strategic and tactical doctrine for the conduct of urban stability operations or urban guerrilla warfare operations which takes into account the peculiarities of the urban operational environment. It is recommended that such a doctrine be developed and promulgated.

2. The US Army Institute for Military Assistance is fitted to assume the role of development of doctrine and training for US Army missions and functions in the area of urban guerrilla warfare. It is recommended that it be assigned these missions and functions.

3. The US Army does not now have available a type organization to be employed in urban stability operations. It is recommended that as a part of the doctrinal development in this area such an organization be developed.

4. Urban guerrilla warfare is essentially political and social in content. It is recommended that the US Army doctrine developed and training programs created for the area of urban guerrilla warfare stress education and training in the behavioral sciences.

5. The US Army does not have a separate doctrinal publication

pertaining to urban guerrilla warfare and urban stability operations. It is recommended that such a manual be published.

6. The possibilities of urban strategic guerrilla warfare are not fully developed. It is recommended that the role of the US Army in urban strategic guerrilla warfare be studied further.

FOOTNOTES

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19. AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 1972, with C1, 1974.

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22. Oppenheimer, op. cit., p. 21-31.
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Examples are taken from these sources except where otherwise noted.
24. AR 310-25, op. cit.
25. Ibid.
26. Copeland, Miles, "Is There a CIA in Your Future?", National Review, March 14, 1975, p. 279.
27. AR 310-25, op. cit.
28. Doss and Hiatt, op. cit.
Oppenheimer, op. cit.
Moss, Urban Guerrillas
29. FM 100-5, Operations of Army Forces in the Field, 1968, Paragraph 5-18 (c)(2).
30. FM 31-23, Stability Operations, US Army Doctrine, Par. 14 et seq. names phases: 1) Passive stage (Strategic defense stage), 2) Active stage (Strategic stalemate stage), 3) Counteroffensive stage; and later refers to these as Phase I Insurgency, Phase II Insurgency, Phase III Insurgency.
RB 31-100, Volume I, Internal Defense, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1971, pp. 1-8 and 1-9 names phases as Phase I, Latent and Incipient, Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare and Phase III, War of Movement. Descriptions of these phases are essentially applicable to rural guerrilla warfare. Will, Urban Guerrilla Warfare and Political Change in the United States describes these phases as Phase I, Revolutionary War, Phase II, Revolutionary War and Phase III, Mobile War. Doss and Hiatt, "The Problem of Urban Insurgency", discusses definitions and phasing.
31. Doss and Hiatt, op. cit., p. 4.
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36. Ibid., p. 89-96.

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38. Copeland, op. cit., p. 274. In Britain the communist plan is to paralyze the nation to prevent it being effective as our ally in the event of a US-USSR conflict.

39. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, 1968, Ch. 3.

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engaged in stability operations. It suggests the possibility of strategic urban guerrilla warfare as a form of war. It discusses legal and doctrinal considerations for the US Army and the possible US Army roles in urban stability operations and strategic guerrilla warfare. It concludes: that the US Army should develop strategic and tactical doctrine for the conduct of urban stability operations; that the US Army Institute for Military Assistance be assigned the task of developing doctrine and training for urban guerrilla warfare; that a type US Army organization be developed for employment in urban stability operations; that said doctrine and training programs stress education and training in the behavioral sciences; that a US Army manual be published on urban guerrilla warfare; and that the role of the US Army in strategic urban guerrilla warfare be studied further. R